THE WORLD SEEN FROM BERLIN. "Germany has never been so free" Essay Henri Menudier professor at the University of Paris III Sorbonne new
Over the past twenty years, Germany has found a very strong position on the international stage. To reassure its neighbors, flaunts weighting and continuity in its foreign policy.
SURPRISING constancy does not exclude that some adjustments ... Until 1990, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has been characterized by a certain reserve due to his past Hitler and division in various parts of the country. Moreover, the internal context was that the foundation of the country in 1949, led to the emergence of the two pillars of the management of international relations. On the one hand, and reset the anchor West, under the guidance of the first chancellor of the FRG, Konrad Adenauer, head of the Union Christian de ¬ mocratica of Germany (CDU). Second, the open ¬ ing in the East - or Ostpolitik. Launched ¬ go from the first winter of the grand coalition between the CDU, the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the social demo ¬ tico Party (SPD) from 1966 to 1969, it will be placed ¬ cally taken up by the Registrars Willy Brandt from 1969 to 1974 , and Helmut Schmidt (SPD) from 1974 to 1982, as well as their successor, Helmut Kohl (CDU) that fits into it after it initially opposed.
You could imagine that the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany would be in the shaft, unleashed a burst of nationalism, a revival of authoritarian forces, maybe a see-saw game between East and West. Upheavals which could lead to a likely break in German foreign policy. In fact, neighboring countries cone ¬ schwa changes that will make obsolete ¬ Leti most atlases: the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the Council for Mutual Economic existence as ¬ (Comecon) (1), the Warsaw Pact; emergence of new state structures: re ¬ forms to 'inside the European Union and the Al ¬ Atlantic Alliance; emergence of new conflicts in the world ...
All these events have truly impressed by Germany. However, his foreign policy has remained cautious and did not mind then ¬ departed considerably from the previous line - except in one case, when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) refused to support U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003 . Over the past two decades, German leaders have in fact gone to great lengths to reassure their re ¬ foreign partner and convince them that the lessons of history had not been forgotten ¬ no.
bow to the French flag. This lack of appetite
¬ tion should change with institu ¬ tions such country-specific as to the person ¬ ality of its political leaders. First, the belief ¬ pluralism, with a wide distribution of powers between the regions (Länder) and federal state urges parties to cooperate rather than to address them. The real disagreements on foreign policy guidelines (anchor West, reset, Ostpolitik, € ¬ missiles) date from before 1989. After the re ¬ unification, prevailing consensus ¬ am rather pious - except, recently, the issue of Inter ¬ wind military in Afghanistan where German soldiers were uc ¬ cise.
Moreover, the Basic Law, particularly Article 65 entrusts the Registrar with the task of outlining the political mainstream. Although the law states that, in this context, "all I-Dniester federal department heads his own car ¬ nomamente and under its responsibility," the power of the head of government is not disputed, and often that its foreign minister is vice-chancellor and even presidents of the other party of the coalition.
loyal to a community approach and multilateral ¬ eral, the various Registrars have managed the crisis by favoring civil solutions. The use of military means, very restrictive, only intervenes at the request of international organizations such as EU, NATO or the UN, and with the consent of Par-tion. Pragmatism, and a weight that did not prevent the new Germany,
very lucid about his interests, to exercise full responsibility increased.
Helmut Kohl (1982-1998), considering the ages of spiritual de ¬ Adenauer, immediately worked to address concerns about his foreign policy ac ¬ declaring that the unity of his country and that Europe was the two sides of one coin. He was one of the main architects of the EC Treaty ¬ Maastricht, signed in 1992, and the Institution of Economic ¬ I and Monetary Union (EMU). The policy must also be ¬ European Union has been and will of NATO to Eastern Europe. An ¬ at the cost of bitter negotiations, Kohl has never ceased to seek the consent of Paris. He said with malice: "In front of the French flag, dob ¬ BIAM always bow twice (2).
numerous tensions with Paris
aware of the limitations and constraints imposed on the country in 1989, Kohl declined the U.S. offer to become the preferred partner. ¬ However Tut are reasons with constitutional ¬ tion - forbidding the Bundeswehr, the new army created in 1955, to intervene outside the borders of NATO - and practical vietaro ¬ no to Germany to participate in the war against Iraq, ¬ after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990-'91. A war that the country supported this common ¬ through a substantial financial contribution ¬ cial, said "politics of checks." In conse ¬ quently, and after the Constitutional Court had faith ¬ eral authorized in 1994 ¬ Tari German military interventions outside the geographical area co ¬ discovery of the Atlantic Alliance, Helmut Kohl began the necessary reform of the Bundeswehr for age ¬ volarne development.
The opposition, the SPD and Greens have criticized the "militarization" of foreign policy. But few months after their arrival in power since Mar ¬ zo June 1999, the Bundeswehr took part in the NATO bombing against Serbia, ¬ nell'inten to - this is the official justification - to provide for ne a "genocide" in Kosovo. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Greens) justified this intervention with a reference to the facts of Auschwitz, "that should not happen again." The government argued that the concept of the common € ¬ European security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and sent soldiers in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Africa.
However the development of the Yugoslav crisis had no ¬ subject Germany to the fires of criticism (3). In December 1991, after encouraging their secession, had in fact hastily recognized Croatia and Slovenia. This de ¬ cision to go it alone earned her exclusion from the negotiations on the former Yugoslavia for two years. At the time of the intervention in Kosovo - ¬ tico problem because it lacks an explicit UN mandate - the Bundeswehr is deployed with its NATO allies to end, according to the German authorities ¬ peaches, the violation of human rights by Serbs, in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe and is ¬ stabilize the region.
Nevertheless, the unilateralism of American policy, his work around the international law and the flaunted contempt for the UN more and more disliked in Berlin. Despite the "unlimited solidarity towards ¬ TY ' promise to George W. Bush ¬ Guito if the attacks of 11 December 2001, Schroder (1998-2005) broke spectacularly with him by refusing to involve his country in the war against Iraq. "The key issues relating to the German nation are treated in Berlin and nowhere else," he proclaimed with Schroder for ¬ za to Parliament September 13, 2002. You probably will not be the financial crisis, economic and social ¬ mica triggered by the failure of Leh man Brothers in 2008 ¬ to ¬ not induce the current government to change course.
Freed from any inferiority complex and de ¬ CISO to loudly defend the interests of na-tional, Schroder sometimes made statements prendenti ¬ sor, especially when he said, in of December 2008: "More than half of the money to burn ¬ is paid by the Germans in Europe (4)." In follow ¬ to, any disagreement with Paris have multiplied: in 1999, about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which is deemed too expensive by Schroder, in 2000, during negotiations on the Treaty of Nice, ir during the dispute about the new weighting of votes in the Council of Europe. However, he worked in a rapprochement between Paris and Moscow, while some ¬ taken apart as the champion of a "German way" (Weg der deutsche) unpleasantly reminded that the details of the 'African way' (Sonderweg) of the second half of the nineteenth century . After the bankruptcy ¬ tion of national movements and liberal, in 1848, the construction of the state and the unification of Germany had resulted in a context of rapid industrialization, in a register me ¬ authoritarian and pan-Germanic, which is opposed to the Western powers.
disappointment within the Union. Despite these linguistic unpleasantness
¬ tics, Schroder was able to handle the report with cautious ¬ tional determination: he has completed the expansion of the Na ¬ and to the Union and did adopt the draft European Constitution that French workers would have dismissed May 29, 2005. In the same year he accepted the victory with hard work, by a narrow margin, a woman, Angela Merkel - who, moreover, supported the Bush policy ...
Chancellor Merkel has resumed dialogue with the United States, made the German foreign policy less dependent on France and moved away from Russia, where President Putin was regarded as disrespectful of human rights. Using tones mo ¬ ered, Merkel sometimes softened his position without giving up its goal: Germany must take more responsibility. In the eyes of the Germans, it has captured a large international authority ¬ de ¬ suc cess chairing the European Council and the G7 in 2007.
claimed successes include the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon to ¬, the resumption of EU-Russia partnership and the Kyoto Protocol on climate. Engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East, Merkel has begun a dialogue with Israel and the Palestinian ¬ sis. Finally, it flaunts a persistent interest to Africa (5) and has never questioned the Bundeswehr's international operations.
very attentive to his partner, Chancellor, however, does not hesitate to disagree with, even with op-porvisi. The management of the financial crisis and eco ¬ nomic world it has created numerous tensions between Paris and Berlin (6). The Merkel ¬ critical to President Bush about the prison if the already-Grete: "An institution like Guantanamo can not and should not have long-term ¬ it," he said in January 2006 (7).
To avoid vexing Russia, Angela Merkel called for the postponement of the entry of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. The threats of retaliation there ¬ sis have not prevented it from receiving the Dalai Lama in 2007 and to ignore the aperture, ¬ tion of the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, because his foreign policy was proposed other objectives, the Court could offer the luxury said of a steam passenger ¬ Beijing. Especially since China can not do without Germany in economic terms.
Nevertheless, the anchor remains the foundation of West Germany's relations with the rest of the world is not placed at equal distance between Washington and Moscow does not believe to be a central power in Europe. Moreover, the crucial challenges that arise in the XXI century Zano ¬ strengthen a multilateral approach.
euro-Atlantic's commitment is based on the Franco-German cooperation, integration € ¬ sion and the Atlantic partnership built with the United States and NATO - two difficult to separate. The declaration of Robert Schuman (May 9, 1950) (8) and the Elysée Treaty (1963) - Treaty of friendship and cooperation between Bonn and Paris - the Franco-German couple plays a leading role in European integration. But it tends to dilute its influence with the subse-quent enlargement of the Union, and despite blatant embraces, the consultation will not prevent the severe clashes content to give this perennial gestation in Europe. As a result we often hear about a funnel ¬ tion of a disappointment, even to an imbal-Franco-German relations.
The fact is that, beyond the differences of style and personality, Sarkozy and Angela Merkel were in disagreement on the draft of an I ¬ Mediterranean area (from which Germany would be excluded) become Union for the Mediterranean independence of the European Central Bank (ECB) and European Union on economic management. Al ¬ three differences appeared about the solutions to the financial and economic crisis and re ¬ organization of the international financial system. Finally, the voltages determined by Greek crisis bring out opposing positions on the issue of 'European solidarity'.
In fact, in March 2010, not to encourage the "laxity" which, in its opinion, the risk of dissem-ders in the euro zone, Angela Merkel shows intransigent against un'Atene battered financial markets. On 23 March, the Chancellor is able to impose its own solution: the use of the IMF and bilateral aid. To reassure the world of finance, on April 11, we arrive at a new ac ¬ Europe Agreement. The amount of bilateral loans will be commensurate with the share that each state has the capital of the ECB, of which Germany is the first contributor. Two approaches are com ¬ pleted: management rigorous in the euro area (po ¬ German position) should go hand in hand with solidarity and a real coordination of economic policies (French position), sen ¬ za tap the ECB's independence.
However, the Franco-German entente is indi ¬ pensable: if it is not enough to move Europe forward, his death would prevent progress re ¬ ago. Moreover, the differences between the two countries, often advertised, should not make ¬ forgetting the importance of convergence - that the close cooperation of their daily go ¬ painted, very busy at the European level, highlights.
The fact is that Europe, closely linked to the story you ¬ desca, keeps a fundamental importance to this country after 1945, it gave a kind of identity substitution and built ¬ to the framework in which the country has been able, gradually recovering its sovereignty confiscated by the Allies. This is the reason why Germany has always held a prominent role in it ¬ tiations Europe. If, however, the 90's, Berlin has prioritized the expansion at the expense of the deepening today shows less interest ¬ tion, more readily accepts the intergovernmental coopera ¬ do not hesitate to defend its interests - as well as other countries.
In 2006, Fischer had pulled the bell of alarm, denouncing "a shift of perspective pro- fatal ", adding:" Europe has stopped being the central project of the German political ca ¬ '(9) and would be seen too much through the prism distorting ¬ to ¬ tional national interests. Both Schroder supported the entry of Turkey into Europe, but Merkel opposes ¬ go, suggesting a privileged partnership, with the risk of displeasing the U.S. ally.
However, the disagreement with Washington about the war in Iraq in 2003 and the disappointment ostentatious by Angela Merkel in front of the little interest shown by President Obama to Europe must not obscure the umbilical link that unites these two powers since 1949. The United States is the origin of the FRG, they have facilitated reconstruction of the country through the Marshall Plan, have provided security and that of Berlin during the Cold War and organized the reset checked in here ¬ framework of NATO. Although the conflicts have been spo ¬ on the outskirts or outside Europe, Ger ¬ mania still depends on U.S. military presence within its borders and, more ¬ lar Similarly, on the mainland.
An extensive network of multilateral cooperation.
THANKS to the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989-'90, Germany has fully restored its traditional links with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Reco). Relations with the Polo ¬ nia and the czech Republic, the subject of much atten ¬ tion, However, this remains difficult because of the e-spulsione of Germans from these countries in 1945. Berlin has also developed an active policy of neighborly relations with neighboring states of Russia (¬ Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova) and in the name of prevention of conflicts, expressing interest to secure the arrangements of the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan ) and Central Asia.
In Germany, the solution of serious problems in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pa ¬ kistan or Iran is the responsibility of organizing ¬ international organizations of which it is a major financial contribution. The policy seeks to restrict the use of force to give priority to multilateral solutions.
In 1990, the promise of substantial economic and financial aid has convinced the USSR to accept German unity. For reasons related to the past (the history of Russian and German empires, world wars of the twentieth century), but also for ra ¬ economic regions (the energy dependence) and strategic (the peace in Europe), relations with Russia are of primary importance for Berlin. The German leaders are careful to show savings ¬ miari a power that has lost a lot of power in the last twenty years. They intertwined with Russia a close network of bilateral cooperation, European and multilateral, while taking care not to awaken the fears of the re ¬ Reco, which have not-forgetting of the protection of the Kremlin.
criticism arose in the lives Following the proposed gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, directly linking Russia and northern Germany, illustrate it be ¬ precautions to be taken by the German leaders. These accusations have been heard since other partners, including France, are now as-ciated with the project. Apart from the crisis poly ¬ cies (Chechnya and Georgia) and persistent disagreement on the issue of human rights, the continued consolidation of economic cooperation and the reduction of energy dependence Ger ¬ maturity are considered key points. In order to assure stability, Berlin, Moscow wants to be a full partner - this objective is relatively easy, compared with the overall ¬ sity of the Asian puzzle.
Asia represents a broad set too diverse for it to be sum-sarily describe the policy followed by Berlin with ¬ in the sides of this continent. If re-gional approach draws a distinction between eastern Asia that ¬ (China, Japan, Korea), the South-East Asia (in particular the countries of the ten ¬ actions in Southeast Asia [ASEAN]) and the Indian sub-continent of Asia (particularly Afghanistan. India and Pakistan). China, in the
2009. has overtaken Germany as the leading power exporter in the world, is the object of great attention, but some years you see a increas developing countries, leading players in international relations in the future.
In its inaugural government statement of 20 September 1949, the first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, had set three objectives for the Federal Republic which, at that time still did not have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs: national sovereignty and equality rights with other na ¬ tions, European, unification. Thanks to a policy that has been able to ade ¬ guarsi to internal changes and developments in the international context, these objectives were met October 3, 1990. Speaking for the first time to Members, November 30, 2005, Chancellor Merkel noted: "Germany has never been as free as it is today."
(1) Organisation for Mutual Economic Assistance between the countries of the communist bloc.
(2) Quoted by Maxime Lefebre, L'Allemagne et l'Europe ", Revue Internationale et Stratégique, n ° 74, Armand Colin, Paris, 2009
(3)" The responsibility of Germany and the Vatican in the acceleration of the crisis 'were' manifestly overwhelming, "declares June 16, 1993 the French foreign minister Roland Dumas. Please read Paul-Ma ¬ Rie de La Gorce, "Les divergences allemandes ex-mises to nu", Le Monde Diplomatique, September 1993.
(4) Quoted by Jacques Pierre Gougeon, L'Allemagne du XXI sits, une nouvelle nation, Armand Colin, Paris, 2009.
(5) Raf Custers read, "The secret intentions of the European countries", Le Monde diplomatique edition, July 2006.
(6) Backed by a strict policy of wage austerity, the German trade balance is flaunting an important focus. This imbalance has been recently criticized (although measured in terms of well ¬) ¬ e the French economy minister, Christine Lagarde. In fact, the assets Germans know ¬ not, necessarily, at ... deficits of its trading partners, including France.
(7) Der explained, Hamburg, January 7, 2006.
(8) II French foreign minister announced the project of the European Coal and Steel Community (Ce ¬ ca), based on un accordo franco-tedesco e realizzato nel 1951.
(9) DerSpiegel, 21 dicembre 2008. (Traduzione di mgg)
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